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Abstract
Electricity transmission has become the pivotal industry segment for electricity restructuring. Yet, 
little is known about the shape of transmission cost functions. Reasons for this can be a lack of 
consensus about the definition of transmission output and the complexitity of the relationship 
between optimal grid expansion and output expansion. Knowledge of transmission cost functions 
could help firms (Transcos) and regulators plan transmission expansion and could help design 
regulatory incentive mechanisms. We explore transmission cost functions when the transmission 
output is defined as point-to-point transactions or financial transmission right (FTR) obligations and 
particularly explore expansion under loop-flows. We test the behavior of FTR-based cost functions 
for distinct network topologies and find evidence that cost functions defined as FTR outputs are 
piecewise differentiable and that they contain sections with negative marginal costs. Simulations, 
however, illustrate that such unusual properties do not stand in the way of applying price-cap 
incentive mechanisms to real-world transmission expansion. 
Key words:  Electricity transmission, cost function, incentive regulation, merchant investment, 
congestion management. 
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1 Introduction 
Under the restructuring of electricity sectors around the world electricity transmission has been 
playing a pivotal role. Electricity transmission enables electricity trade within and across countries. 
It can enhance competition. It can increase the reliability of the electricity system and substitute for 
lack of generation in certain areas. Congestion and failure of electricity transmission can lead to 
brownouts and blackouts over large regions. Before restructuring transmission was usually 
vertically integrated with often large generation companies and sometimes also with distribution 
companies. More recently, independent transmission entities (Transcos) have been emerging.  
All these developments have raised interest in electricity transmission services and led to extensive 
research studying the economic properties of transmission systems.1 We know that electricity 
transmission differs in many ways from other transportation systems, such as pipelines, railroads or 
the road system, and from other network industries, such as telecommunications. The physical laws 
of electricity make transmission complex and unusual. It is therefore not surprising that – to the best 
of our knowledge - no one so far has characterized a cost function for transmission grids. Two 
specific reasons appear to be responsible for this lack. One is that there is no full agreement on an 
obvious output, to which costs could be related. Thus, there may exist cost characterizations for the 
transmission grid as a set of line capacities, but, in our view, such capacities are definitely not the 
transmission outputs. The second reason for a lack of cost function characterizations is that the 
effects of Kirchhoff’s laws lead to bewildering irregularities in the relationship between outputs and 
capacities. An example of such irregularities is the famous Wu et al. (1996) paper on (the pitfalls 
of) folk theorems on transmission access. As a result transmission cost functions are likely to have 
strange properties that would make them interesting for an audience outside electricity. Where else 
can you expect to have negative marginal costs?  
Thus, the current paper provides a first characterization of the general shapes of transmission cost 
functions (based on a more tentative earlier attempt in Hogan, Rosellón and Vogelsang, 2007; in the 
following: HRV).  
Besides satisfying an intellectual curiosity the knowledge about properties of such cost functions 
can be put to use, among others, as a planning tool for Transcos and regulators. If one knows their 
cost functions one can plan cost-minimizing transmission systems over a wide range of potential 
outputs. This would also take care of reliability issues requiring the availability of alternative paths 
in case of network failures or of unplanned electricity injections at some nodes because of 
                                                     
1 Examples include Schweppe et al. (1988), Hogan (1992), Bushnell and Stoft (1996, 1997), Chao and Peck (1996), Oren 
et al. (1995), Pérez-Arriaga et al., 1995), Rubio-Oldériz and Pérez-Arriaga (2000), Wu et al. (1996), Joskow and Tirole 
(2000, 2005).  
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generation failure at other nodes. The knowledge of a transmission cost function could also help 
assess investments in renewable energies, such as wind power, that may require substantial 
transmission investments. In addition, the knowledge of transmission cost functions can aid the 
implementation of incentive mechanisms for transmission investment. We will show that 
specifically for the HRV mechanism, but it should in principle hold as well for Bayesian 
mechanisms by using techniques similar to Gasmi et al. (2002). 
The regulatory analyses on incentives for electricity transmission expansion postulate transmission 
cost and demand functions with fairly general properties, and then adapt regulatory adjustment 
processes to the electricity transmission expansion problem. Under well-behaved cost and demand 
functions (and assuming a natural monopoly2), appropriate weights (such as Laspeyres weights) 
grant convergence to equilibrium conditions (Vogelsang, 2001, Tanaka, 2007, Rosellón, 2007, and 
Léautier, 2000). A criticism of this approach is that the properties of transmission cost and demand 
functions are little known but are suspected to differ from conventional functional forms (Hogan, 
2000, 2002a, Vogelsang, 2006, and HRV, 2007). Hence the assumed cost and demand properties 
may not hold in a real network with loop-flows since decreasing marginal cost segments and 
discontinuities in the costs can arise during an expansion project. Furthermore, a conventional linear 
definition of the transmission output – similar to the output definition for other economic 
commodities – is in fact difficult since the physical flow through loop-flowed meshed networks is 
complex and highly interdependent among transactions (Bushnell and Stoft, 1997, and Hogan, 
2002a, 2002b). 
In this paper, we study long-run electricity transmission cost functions based upon a definition of 
transmission output in terms of point-to-point transactions or financial transmission right (FTR) 
obligations. We build on the HRV (2007) model which combines merchant and regulatory 
approaches in an environment of price-taking generators and loads.3 The HRV model also shows 
that FTR-based cost functions exhibit very normal economic properties in a variety of 
circumstances. This particularly holds if the topology of all nodes and links is given and only the 
capacity of lines can be changed, implying that abnormally behaving cost functions require changes 
to network topology.4 We study in more detail these conclusions, and test the behavior of FTR-
based cost functions for distinct network topologies. We focus on two basic cases. In the first we 
adjust line capacities, but nodes, lines, impedances and thus the power transmission distribution 
                                                     
2 Dismukes, Cope III and Mesyanzhinov (1998) empirically show the validity of the natural-monopoly assumption for 
electricity transmission. 
3 The model is an extension of Vogelsang (2001) for meshed projects. While designed for Transcos, it can be applied 
under an ISO setting.
4 By a network topology, we mean a set of nodes with their locations and a set of lines with associated impedances 
between these nodes. 
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factors (PTDFs) do not change.5 This framework allows us to single out the effect of loop-flows on 
transmission costs. In the second case we allow for changes in line impedances (and thus the 
PTDFs) correlated to the changes of line capacities. These cases provide insights about the 
relationship between PTDFs, transmission capacity, and transmission costs. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the characterization of transmission 
outputs in terms of FTRs. In Section 3 we address the mathematical cost-function model as well as 
its adaptation to a computer programming model. In this section, we also describe the dataset used 
to make simulations as well as the different functional forms to be tested. The results of simulations 
are presented and discussed for fixed and variable line reactances in Section 4. This section also 
identifies the challenges associated with consideration of the effects on cost functions of changes in 
network topology. In Section 5 we illustrate through simulation results how the properties we found 
for transmission cost functions are conducive to the functioning of the HRV regulatory mechanism. 
Section 6 concludes. 
2 Characterization of Electricity Transmission Outputs 
In a vertically separated setting with transmission provided by a stand-alone Transco, the grid is 
used by generators that want to deliver electricity to load-serving entities (loads, or LSEs), and by 
entities that want to purchase from generators with or without the help of intermediaries. 
Transmission makes these transactions possible thus the Transco’s chief service is to provide 
delivery between generation nodes and consumption nodes. Bushnell and Stoft (1997), and Hogan 
(2002a, 2002b) argue that the definition of the output for transmission is difficult since the physical 
flow through a meshed transmission network is complex and highly interdependent among 
transactions.
Under a network with loop flows, outputs could be defined as bilateral trades between pairs of 
nodes that aggregate to net injections at all nodes. This idea derives from the FTR literature which 
does not consider transmission activity as an output (or throughput) process, but instead 
concentrates on “point-to-point” (PTP) financial transactions based on rights, obligations and 
options (Hogan, 2002b). Physical transmission rights are also discussed in the FTR literature. 
However, as mentioned above tracing the physical flow is impractical. The superiority of FTRs over 
physical rights has been analytically demonstrated as well (Joskow and Tirole, 2000).6
                                                     
5 The network topology is described by the network incidence matrix (Léautier, 2000, p. 83). Given the topology there is a 
set of power transfer distribution factors (PTDF) that govern the flows on the individual lines. 
6 PTP forward obligations have proved to be the most feasible financial instrument in practice, compared to PTP options 
and flowgate rights. PTP-FTR obligations can be either “balanced” or “unbalanced”. A perfect hedge is achieved through 
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The difference between an FTR and a physical right can be analyzed via a three-node-network 
setting (see Figure 1). Assuming equal line characteristics, power injected and withdrawn at two 
nodes within the system (e.g., 9 MW) will cause 2/3 of the energy (6 MW) to flow on the direct 
connection (n2-n3) and 1/3 (6 MW) will flow over the longer connection (n2-n1, n1-n3). Given a 
transmission amount of 9 MW the corresponding FTR would be a point-to-point right of 9 MW 
from node 2 to node 3, whereas the corresponding physical representation would be a 6 MW right 
for the direct link (n2-n3) and two 3 MW rights for the flow over the other two lines (n2-n1, n1-n3) 
(Figure 1, case 1). Assuming a second injection-withdrawal pair of 3 MW between node 1 and node 
3, the corresponding power flow values will lead to counter flows on the line between node 1 and 
node 2 (Figure 1, case 2).
The changed market conditions of case 2 have an impact on the underlying physical rights: In case 
netting is not allowed, the counter-flow effect will not be accounted and although only 2 MW will 
flow from node 2 to node 1 both market participants will be required to hold a physical right of 3 
and 1 MW respectively. In case netting is respected, the required physical position of the 9 MW 
injection would change reducing the required capacity right for the counter flow link to 2 MW. 
FTRs do not account for a specific power flow pattern, and thus the holder of the 9 MW FTR will 
not have to alter any position due to changes in the market dispatch. Any impact on the power flow 
and congestion situation will be fully reflected by changes in the nodal prices. 
In this paper, we capture the delivery function of electricity among nodes via FTRs that are defined 
between nodes. An FTR qij represents the right to inject electricity in the amount of q at node i and 
to take delivery of the same amount at node j (this definition for FTRs works for obligations, as 
opposed to other hedging instruments such as options). The FTR does not specify the path taken 
between i and j. It is a flow concept and therefore applies to a discrete point in time and to PTP 
transactions.
Therefore, to analyze the cost behavior of extending meshed networks we must define the 
transmission output as PTP transactions. Whereas in directed networks like natural gas or oil an 
additional unit of output that normally can be associated with a well-defined cost parameter or 
function, additional output in electricity networks depends on the grid conditions, and cannot be 
considered separately from the output setting. 
                                                                                                                                                                 
a balanced PTP-FTR, while an unbalanced PTP-FTR obligation can be seen as a forward sale of energy. See also Hogan 
(2002b).
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Figure 1: Power flows and transmission rights 
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Source: Own representation 
3 Model, Topologies and Data 
3.1 The FTR cost-function model 
The potential problems of transmission cost functions alluded to earlier derive from loop-flows that 
may produce decreasing or even negative marginal costs and discontinuities. Theoretically these 
problems can be solved with free disposal, but electricity cannot be freely disposed.7 One purpose 
of our study is to establish that the problem of non well-behaved, non-continuous transmission cost 
functions is related to demand changes that lead to a change in network topology (as suggested by 
HRV, 2007). We restrict our analysis to cases where the network topology is not changed, first 
studying cases with no changes in impedances, and then addressing the effects of loop-flows in 
switched networks. 
We define network topology as a set of nodes and their locations and a set of lines between nodes. 
Generation nodes and consumption nodes are naturally given by the set of transmission outputs 
(FTRs), while free nodes are deliberately chosen for optimization of the network topology. A three-
node network could be associated either with three lines connecting all three nodes, with three 
possible combinations of two lines, or with three possibilities of one line. Obviously, in the cases of 
a single line one node would be an orphan and could not be used for injecting or consuming 
electricity. The network topology is described by the network incidence matrix (Léautier, 2000, p. 
                                                     
7 A downward-sloping total cost curve for an FTR (i.e., with negative marginal costs) means that a larger FTR is provided 
at a lower cost. The question is if the unused part of the FTRs can be thrown away. It could be argued that the additional 
amount of FTRs can only be provided by actually injecting and taking out the required additional electricity. This would 
incur an additional cost of generation, which would contradict free disposal.  
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83). For a given network topology we assume that the line capacity is variable so that it can be 
changed between 0 and , but at a cost. There may be a fixed cost at zero capacity.  
To derive an FTR-based cost function for transmission we examine the properties of power-flows in 
meshed networks. We use the DC load-flow model (DCLF) as proposed by Schweppe et al. (1988), 
which focuses on real power-flows and neglects reactive power-flows within a network. Although a 
simplification, the approach still yields reasonable results for locational price signals and grid 
utilization (see e.g., Overbye et al., 2004). 
The complete approximation of the DCLF from the physical fundamentals of transmission lines is 
presented e.g., in Stigler and Todem (2005). The principle of a DCLF is that flows pfij on a line 
depend on the voltage angel difference ij and the line series susceptance Bij between the two nodes 
i and j:
   power-flow between i and j (1)ijijij Bpf  8
The power-flow on one line also has an impact on the energy balance of its connected nodes. For 
each node i in a system the net injection qi must equal the sum of power-flows on connected lines: 
    energy balance at i    (2) 
j
iji pfq
If more energy is to be delivered to or from node i all power-flows and nodes on lines connected to 
that node are affected, continuing throughout the network. Therefore, the resulting power-flow 
pattern depends on all system conditions. 
To assess the costs of transmission, we define the transactions qij between two nodes i and j as the 
relevant output. These FTR PTP transactions are determined as a specific load value, e.g., in MW 
that must be transmitted between the two nodes. There is no pre-specified line utilization associated 
with an FTR. Market participants can bid for specific FTRs and the system operator allocates them 
accordingly, maximizing the revenue from the FTRs given the network’s available transmission 
capacity. FTRs are assumed to be obligations, thus the associated energy transfer can be taken for 
granted.
                                                     
8 The reactance X represents the opposition of a line towards alternating current, based on the inductance and/or 
capacitance of the line. Together with the resistance R, they define the impedance of a line and thus determine the amount 
of power flowing over this line given the net injections. The line series susceptance Bij is then derived via: 22
ijij
ij
ij RX
X
B

  
Generally, the resistance is assumed to be significantly smaller than the reactance  (X >> R), and thus we do not consider 
it further in this analysis simplifying the susceptance to: 
ij
ij X
B 1
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We define the transmission costs function c(.) of network extension as the least costs combination 
of line capacities k necessary to satisfy Qij  (the matrix consisting of a specific set of FTR 
combinations qij):
   transmission cost function   (3) )(min)(
,
ij
ji
ijkij
kfQc
i

Thus, our approach is one of long-run cost functions, where capacity is optimally adjusted to each 
output. 
Next, each line capacity kij is associated with a specific cost value via an extension function f(.).
Minimization is subject to technical restrictions representing the network’s power-flow 
characteristics: 
ijkpf ijij 	    line capacity constraint    (4) 
 energy balance constraint   (5) ipfqq
j
ij
j
ji
j
ij 
 
First, power-flows pfij on the lines must remain within the capacity limits kij defined by the system 
operator when designing the grid (equation 4). Second, at each node i the sum of outgoing FTRs 
(qij) and ingoing FTRs (qji) must equal the sum of power-flows on connected lines pfij (equation 5).  
To examine the characteristics of the FTR-based cost function in (3) we incorporate this model in 
General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) as a non-linear minimization tool, with the overall 
grid extension costs as an objective function and looped over a specific set of FTRs.  
3.2 Network topologies and dataset 
We use a numeric data set representing idealized market characteristics to test our FTR-based cost 
function model. We consider two grid topologies to carry out our simulations (Figure 2):
1. An initial grid topology that comprises a three-node network with two generation nodes and 
one demand node representing the basic loop-flowed network structure. 
2. An extended six-node network with two generation nodes and one demand node.  
FTRs are defined from the generation node to the demand node, and vary between 1 MW and 
10 MW respectively, to estimate the resulting global-cost function.  
For network extension behavior, we next analyze two cases: 
1. Only the capacity of a line can be changed whereas the line’s reactance remains unchanged. 
Thus, an extension only impacts the transmission capacity of the system, but does not alter 
the power-flow pattern and PTDF structure. This approach is theoretical, since in reality 
pure capacity increases are only possible for small-scale extensions. It assesses the impact 
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of loop flows on transmission costs without the interfering influence of power-flow 
changes.
2. Line extensions are combined with a change of the line’s reactance and the added capacity 
changes the network’s power-flow pattern as well as the PTDFs. This approach resembles 
the real world problem that a new or upgraded line affects the entire network, and leads to 
externalities for other market participants.  
We test four forms of line extension costs functions fij(kij): constant marginal cost,  decreasing 
marginal cost (economies of scale), increasing marginal costs (diseconomies of scale), and lumpy 
behavior.9
 Linear function (constant marginal cost):   ijijij kbf 
 Logarithmic function (economies of scale):   ijijijij kbaf  ln
 Quadratic function (diseconomies of scale):  2ijijij kbf 
Lumpy function:      ijijij kbf  with Zkij
The first three extension functions represent a continuous approach, which is an approximation of 
the lumpy investment pattern of electricity networks and the fourth directly accounts for the integer 
nature of line extensions. For all scenarios network topology is fixed; new connections cannot be 
built and existing connections cannot be abolished. We assume that each line has the same starting 
characteristics for capacity and reactance. 
When only the line capacities are extended, the presented extension cost functions are sufficient to 
derive a numerical solution. In the case of a connection between extensions and line reactances, the 
law of parallel circuits10 is applied to derive a functional connection between capacity extensions 
and line characteristics Bij(kij). Thus, doubling the capacity results in a bisection of a line reactance. 
Whereas the first approach does not require specific start values for line capacities, the latter 
approach needs initial network characteristics to obtain results. We test the cases using a series of 
numerical analyses, varying the underlying parameter. An overview of the basic data set is provided 
in Table 1.
9 Although diseconomies of scale are rather unlikely in electricity networks they are included for the sake of 
completeness. 
10 In a parallel circuit the total resistance of the system is defined by 
i i
total R
R 11 .
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Figure 2: Network topologies
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n3
line1
line2
line3
n2line1n1 n3
n4
n5
n6
line2
line3
line4 line5
line6
line7
line8 line9
Three-node network Six-node network
Source: Own representation 
Table 1: Scenario overview for cost function calculation 
Fixed line reactances Variable line reactances 
Starting line reactances 1
Line extension functional 
parameters 
aij = bij = 1 aij = bij = 1 
Starting capacity values [MW] kij = 0 kij = 2 
Three node network 
FTR range [MW] FTR 1 to 3: 1 to 5 
FTR 2 to 3: 1 to 10 
Six node network 
FTR range [MW] FTR 1 to 6: 1 to 5 FTR 5 to 6: 1 to 10 
Source: Own assumptions 
4 Scenarios and Results 
We first present the results for the cases with fixed-line reactances and thus the impact of loop 
flows on extension costs. To single out the effects we start with the extension of one FTR while the 
other is kept fixed, and then allow both FTRs to be extended. We then analyze the case with a 
linkage of capacity and reactances – case of variable line reactances – to estimate the combined 
impact on extension costs. We end with a discussion of the results.  
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4.1 Fixed line reactances 
In the fixed-reactance case, the loop flows are predetermined and cannot be altered in any sense 
when the net input is modified at nodes. The resulting cost function will represent a network with 
line capacities that fully resemble the power-flow on each line. 
4.1.1 Extending one FTR 
In the three-node system line 1 (between nodes 1 and 2) is subject to power-flows in opposite 
directions depending on the value of the two FTRs. Given a fixed level of one FTR, an increase in 
the second FTR will first lead to a decrease in the flow on line 1 towards zero until both FTRs have 
the same value. Afterwards, the flow will again increase, although in the opposite direction. The 
resulting capacity cost for increasing the FTR value will show a “kink” at the level of the fixed FTR 
which in our example is equal to 2.5 (Figure 3, left side). In the linear and logarithmic cases the 
kink can clearly be distinguished. In the quadratic case the slope of the line extension function 
around zero is almost horizontal with gradual changes. Thus, the loop-flow kink does not occur. In 
the lumpy case the needed capacity on the loop-flowed line is the lowest when both injections 
cancel each other out. Any divergence from that state, no matter how small, will make it necessary 
to install the next integer capacity level which results in a sharp decrease and increase of the cost 
function around that point which can be observed at a level of 2.5 MW (Figure 3, left side).
In the six-node case the number of loop-flowed lines is extended to five (lines 1, 2, 5, 6, and 7). 
However, lines 2, 5, and 6 will cancel out their flows at the same FTR level because of network 
symmetry; thus, only three counter-flow kinks are obtained. Furthermore, the counter-flow on line 1 
will only be observed if the FTR from node 1 to node 6 is low compared to the FTR from node 5 to 
6 due to the small power-flow share caused by the second FTR on line 1. For the 2.5 MW case we 
only observe two kinks (Figure 3, right side), one at 1.25 MW (canceling out the flows on line 7) 
and the second at 5 MW (canceling out the flows on lines 2, 5, and 6). The last kink occurs at a FTR 
value of 20 MW, which is outside the observation range. In particular the lumpy-cost curve shows 
the impact of several interacting loop flows: shortly after the first kink resulting from the counter-
flow on line 7 at 1.25 MW, the cost function first increases and then decreases. This negative 
marginal cost range is caused by the reduced power-flow on line 1. Thus, the increasing and 
decreasing ranges of several counter-flows can lead to overlapping cost effects. 
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Figure 3: Cost function fixing one FTR, three-node and six-node network, fixed reactances 
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4.1.2 Extending two FTRs (global cost function case) 
If both FTRs are varied the resulting cost function behavior will still represent the counter-flow 
conditions. In the three-node case, we observe the kink of line 1 moving gradually with the 
increasing FTRs, which is best visualized in the logarithmic case (Figure 4, left side). The same 
holds true for the linear extension case, whereas the quadratic case again shows no signs of kinks.11
The lumpy investment case shows a more varied structure (Figure 4, right side). This is due to the 
combined extension of both FTRs: as the flows split up 2:1 respectively at specific extension steps, 
it becomes necessary to extend two or even all three lines in the system.12 Specifically, we see 
several areas with negative marginal costs. Thus, the global cost function is a combination of 
counter-flow based cost reduction on line 1, and possible capacity steps of 1, 2, or 3 MW depending 
on the net injection.  
The same outcome holds true in the six-node case. The resulting global cost function shows three 
kinks, which again are best visualized in the logarithmic case (Figure 5, left side). The kink on the 
left side is associated with negative marginal costs and represents the counter-flow on line 1 which 
requires a low level of the FTR from 1 to 6, and a high level of the FTR from 5 to 6. The kink in the 
middle represents the counter-flows on lines 2, 5, and 6, and the right kink represents the flow on 
line 7. The lumpy investment case is again highly fragmented and shows negative marginal costs 
(Figure 5, right side) due to the interaction of counter-flows and capacity steps. 
                                                     
11 Linear and quadratic cases are presented in the Appendix. 
12 For instance, keeping the FTR from 1 to 3 fixed to 0, if the FTR from 2 to 3 is extended from 3 to 3.1 the line capacities 
must all be extended by 1 MW (line 1 and 2 have 1 MW, line 3 has 2 MW). This allows the increased power- flow pattern 
and causes a step of 3 MW.  
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Figure 4: Global cost function, three-node network, fixed reactances 
Lumpy extension costsLogarithmic extension costs
Source: Own calculation 
Figure 5: Global cost function, six-node network, fixed reactances 
Lumpy extension costsLogarithmic extension costs
Source: Own calculation 
4.2 Variable line reactances 
In reality, there are limitations to extending a line capacity without altering its technical power-flow 
characteristics. Normally, a capacity extension is linked to a change in the reactance of the line. 
Therefore, in our second scenario capacity extensions are coupled to line reactances via the law of 
parallel circuits. Thus a doubling of a line’s capacity results in a bisection of a line reactance. The 
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combined loop-flow nature of power-flows and the change in network characteristics due to 
capacity extensions makes a prediction of the possible outcomes more complicated.  
4.2.1 Extending one FTR 
Whereas in the fixed-reactance scenario it was clear beforehand that the power-flow on one line 
will fall to zero for a specific FTR combination, this may not be true in this scenario since the 
canceling-out point can change with the alteration of network characteristics. This can clearly be 
seen in the three- and six-node cases. All cost functions allow no conclusion regarding the status of 
counter-flows and of potentially negative marginal costs within the system (Figure 6), because line 
1 is not extended for the three-node case. Increasing the capacity of line 3 will lead to a larger 
power-flow on that line relative to the path over node 1 utilizing line 1 and 2. This allows the full 
utilization of the starting capacity values of those lines (2 MW). Therefore, the cost function only 
resembles the extension cost of increasing capacity on line 3 which consequently is a continuous 
function or an increasing stepwise function in the lumpy case (see Figure 6, left side). 
The same holds true for the six-node case. By extending the most-utilized lines the power-flow 
share on these lines also increases, which avoids further extension. However, contrary to the 3-node 
case more than one line needs to be extended along the FTR range. Thus, kinks can occur when the 
extension includes more lines or when it switches the extended line. In addition we observe for the 
logarithmic case that more capacity is added on a line than is actually utilized, due to the decreasing 
marginal extension cost. The capacity extension has an impact on the power-flow distribution 
regardless of the actual flow over that line. By building more capacity on a line than needed, the 
power-flow pattern can be altered in such a way that less capacity is needed on other lines. Since 
the marginal extension cost in the logarithmic case is the highest for initial extension and decreases 
with capacity, it is less costly to extend a line that may not be fully utilized if other initial capacity 
extension can be avoided. This is the case in the first kink at 3.55 MW (Figure 6, right side). This 
situation may also switch back – making another line the less costly alternative to be extended – if 
the costs for excess capacity are no longer counteracted by a beneficial power-flow distribution. 
This is the case for the second kink at 5.2 MW where the former extended line 8 is no longer 
extended, and the full additional capacity shifts to line 9, which alters the power-flow pattern.13
                                                     
13 The inconsistencies of the logarithmic cost function around 5 MW in the six-node case are due to the solve process 
utilizing Baron as GAMS solver. Using Conopt and Coinipot as solvers produces a higher cost function within that range, 
hinting at problems in obtaining the lowest local optimum. 
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Figure 6: Cost function fixing one FTR, three-node and six-node network, variable reactances 
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4.2.2 Extending two FTRs (global cost function case) 
If both FTRs are increased simultaneously, the resulting cost function in the three-node case shows 
a decrease at a specific FTR range (Figure 7). These results are obtained in all extension cases 
including the quadratic function (see Appendix). However, this range has no resemblance to the 
kink observed in the fixed reactance case which was solely attributable to the unavoidable counter-
flow on line 1. In this case the decreasing cost range is attributed to the absence of a counter-flow in 
the very first case (FTR from 1 to 3 is “0”). The power-flow within the system therefore is only 
defined by the FTR from 2 to 3 and consequently the flow on line 1 is higher than in all other cases, 
making an extension of this line necessary (or a much larger extension of line 3). Increasing the 
FTR from 1 to 3 produces a counter-flow on line 1 and allows better utilization of the existing 
capacity. This effect makes the overall extension less costly (negative marginal costs both in the left 
and the right figure).  
In the six-node case this dominant effect of a single line is canceled out by the increased number of 
loop-flowed lines. Within the observation range the non-lumpy cost function shows a continuous 
behavior with monotonically increasing global costs for increasing FTR values (Figure 8). The 
lumpy case shows an increasing cost pattern without a large fragmentation. Whether this behavior 
also extends beyond the observation range is not clear. 
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Figure 7: Global cost function, three-node network, variable reactances 
Lumpy extension costsLogarithmic extension costs
Source: Own calculation 
Figure 8: Global cost function, six-node network, variable reactances 
Lumpy extension costsLogarithmic extension costs
Source: Own calculation 
4.3 Discussion
Table 2 presents a summary that compares the cases addressed in Sections 4.1 and 4.2. We can 
deduce some conclusions regarding the relationship of kinks, negative slopes and loop-flows for the 
non-lumpy cost functions. First, we observe that smoothness is gained with variable reactances in 
the three-node case. Whereas in the fixed-reactance scenario it was clear that for specific FTR 
combinations the power-flow on one line will fall to zero and cause kinks in both the 1-FTR and 
global-cost function cases, this is not valid in the variable-reactance scenario because the canceling-
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out points can change with the alteration of network characteristics. Additionally, for the global-
cost function case the counter-flow structure may imply decreasing ranges of the cost function. 
The analysis for the six-node case is richer because of its complex network topology and loop-flow 
structure. However, in the global-cost function case the same conclusion prevails: the relationship 
among different loop-flows is such that continuity in the cost function is gained when reactances are 
allowed to vary. Non-lumpy cost functions then show a smooth behavior but with increasing global 
costs for increased FTR values. The above results apply to the lumpy extension case where by 
definition, network expansion is carried out within a discontinuous environment. The obvious 
difference is that the gains from considering variable reactances will imply an increasing stepwise 
function. The results indicate that taking into account the full characteristics of electricity networks 
provides a cost framework that is closer to the well-behaved continuous functionality postulated in 
regulatory theory.  
Although not fully general, the above comparative analysis suggests that piece-wise continuity of 
cost functions is a concrete advantage of a transmission cost analysis based on FTRs instead of 
power-flows. This property is crucial for the application of price-cap incentive mechanisms to real-
world expansion projects.14 Especially when we assume increasing returns to scale, the resulting 
capacity extension pattern includes sudden shifts in the extended lines which in turn cause a 
significant alteration in power-flows. When we define the transmission output as line power-flows, 
the shifts will cause jumps in the resulting cost functions. Whereas the redefinition via a FTR 
approach only takes into account the overall extension costs and thus avoids line specific 
discontinuities. 
A further issue that would generalize this analysis considers a more realistic scenario of electricity 
networks. When cost minimization occurs over the optimal design of the network (i.e., the location 
and number of links and nodes denoted by the transfer-admittance matrix H), the network topology 
is affected accordingly. In this case, H becomes a variable, and a more complicated cost 
minimization problem results. The problem also leads to new goods (FTRs) for new nodes, and 
these new goods change the costs for all of the old goods. Hence, all FTRs are affected if free nodes 
are added or removed. 
One way to first address this problem is to consider an incremental change in network architecture. 
The method would calculate the cost function for the changed network, and then compare it to the 
cost function of the original network. If the new cost function lies everywhere below (above) the 
                                                     
14 See Rosellón and Weigt (2007) for an example of a concrete application of an FTR incentive mechanism for 
transmission expansion in North Western Europe. 
17
original cost function, the new topology dominates (is dominated by) the original one. Most likely, 
as suggested by our previous simulations, one will dominate the other only over part of its range.   
Another solution is to evaluate ways to minimize costs for the network topology alternatives.  If, for 
simplicity, we assume that the nodes are given by the location of power stations and load centers, 
one has to choose between different line configurations. The number of configurations will grow 
quickly with the number of nodes. But after identifying all cost functions for all topologies, the 
long-term cost function will be the minimum cost locus (the lower envelope).  
Table 2: Overview of results 
Fixed Reactance Variable Reactance 
1 FTR Fixed 2 FTRs 1 FTR Fixed 2 FTRs 
Three
nodes
 Resulting capacity cost 
for increasing an FTR value 
will show a “kink” at the 
level of the fixed FTR.  
 In the lumpy extension 
case, the kink is 
represented by a jump in 
the step function. 
 In the quadratic case the 
slope of the line extension 
close to the origin is almost 
horizontal, thus the loop-
flow kink does not occur. 
 The kink of lines moves 
gradually with increasing 
FTRs.
 The lumpy investment 
case is a combination of 
cost reductions based on 
counter-flows and capacity 
steps depending on net 
injections.
 The quadratic case 
shows no signs of kinks.  
 No clear correlation 
between counter-flows and 
kinks as the canceling-out 
point of counter-flows 
changes with the alteration 
of network characteristics.  
 The cost function will 
resemble the extension cost 
of increasing capacity on 
the most utilized line 
causing a continuous cost 
function. 
 The resulting cost 
function can show a 
decreasing part at a specific 
FTR range attributed to the 
missing of a sufficient 
counter-flow. 
Six
nodes
 Lines 2, 5, and 6 will 
cancel out their flows at the 
same FTR level due to the 
network symmetry, and 
thus three counter-flow 
kinks are obtained.  
 The lumpy-cost curve 
shows the impact of several 
interacting loop flows: the 
cost function first increases 
and then decreases again.
 Resulting global cost 
function shows three kinks.  
 The lumpy investment 
case is highly fragmented 
due to the interaction of 
counter-flows and capacity 
steps.
 By extending the most 
utilized lines the power-
flow share on those lines 
also increases, and the need 
to extend other lines is 
reduced.
 Kinks can occur when 
the extension includes 
further lines or when it 
switches the extended 
line(s).
 In the logarithmic case 
more capacity is added on a 
line than is actually utilized 
(due to decreasing marginal 
extension costs), altering 
the power-flow pattern so 
that less capacity is needed 
on other lines. 
 The dominant effect of a 
single line is canceled out 
by the increased number of 
loop-flowed lines in the 
system. 
 Within the observation 
range the cost functions 
show a continuous behavior 
with increasing global costs 
for increased FTR values.  
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5 Application to a regulatory mechanism for transmission expansion 
Under incentive mechanisms for Transcos proposed by Vogelsang (2001) and HRV (2007), 
investments will continue through time until they converge to an optimal (Ramsey-price) level. 
However, this only holds under the assumptions that transmission’s demand functions are 
differentiable and downward-sloped and that the marginal cost curves cut demands only once. 
However, our observations above (in Figure 2 right, Figure 3 left and right, Figure 4 right and 
Figure 6 left and right) exhibit areas of negative marginal costs (where the total cost function either 
jumps down or has a negative slope). This is something that never happens with "normal" cost 
functions and could potentially violate the assumptions necessary for the working and convergence 
of such mechanisms. The local presence of such anomalities, however, does not necessarily mean 
that the mechanism would not converge or would not converge to the optimum. The firm may end 
up at a local, not global optimum, though. It appears that these concerns may not have too much 
weight, as the following simulation results by Rosellon and Weigt (2007) illustrate: 
Applying a simple three-node setting as presented in Figure 2, they show that the regulatory 
mechanism grants convergence towards the welfare optimal solution over time. The obtained results 
are robust to changes in the underlying network, demand, and generation assumptions. Extending 
the model approach to represent the North-West European electricity market with the Netherlands, 
Belgium, France, and Germany the obtained results show a convergence of price levels within the 
region due to the extensions carried out by a regulated Transco (Figure 9). The network 
representation with 15 nodes and 28 lines in Rosellon and Weigt (2007) exceeds the range of the 
networks analyzed in this paper and consists of several injection points, counter flow situations, and 
congestion problems. Although, the actual transmission cost function has not been derived, the 
results suggest that the conclusions drawn from the cost function analysis could also hold for more 
complex network topologies. 
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Figure 9: Price development in the European model 
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Source: based on Rosellon and Weigt (2007). “D” stands for Germany, “F” for France, “BE” for Belgium, 
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6 Conclusion
We analyzed the cost functions of electricity transmission when the transmission output is redefined 
in terms of FTR point-to-point transactions. We were motivated to do so because smooth, well-
behaved cost functions may not hold in meshed network with loop-flows. Likewise, a conventional 
definition of the electricity transmission is not possible since the physical flow through loop-flowed 
meshed transmission networks obey Kirchhoff’s laws. We explicitly tried to provide more evidence 
for the intuition suggested in the literature that ill-behaved non-continuous transmission cost 
functions are mainly due to capacity changes that modify network topology. We therefore focused 
on fixed topology networks with two cases, one where line capacities could change but not the lines 
reactances, and the other where changes in line reactances linking capacity extensions and power-
flow distribution are allowed. 
Our simulations in general suggest that FTR-based cost functions remain piecewise continuous – as 
well as piecewise differentiable – over the entire FTR range. Regions with negative marginal costs 
could cause concern. However, they seem to shrink, as one moves to more realistic (multi-node) 
networks and includes changes in reactances in the model. This then provides support for 
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applications of mechanisms that use FTRs to promote network expansion. More specifically, our 
results showed that compared with the fixed-network case the introduction of variable line 
reactances significantly changes the possible outcomes. In particular, the introduction of a link 
between capacity and reactance appears to reduce the impact of loop-flows in terms of significant 
kinks. Therefore, one general result is that smoothness of non-lumpy cost functions is gained with 
variable reactances. In a lumpy environment, this result translates to variable reactances, implying 
increasing stepwise functions. 
Overall, our results reveal the difficulties that electricity networks present when applying standard 
approaches. Even for a simple extension, loop-flows can lead to a mathematically complex global 
cost function. This in turn makes the estimation of revenue and profits more complex in a general 
setting. Additionally, the link between capacity extension and line reactances (and thus flow 
patterns) produces results that are highly sensitive to the grid structure.
For modeling purposes, the logarithmic and lumpy behaviors produce high degrees of nonlinearities 
with non-smoothness, and require further calculations and solver capabilities, the quadratic 
functions show a generally continuous behavior, and the linear extension functions fall somewhere 
between. Most suitable for modeling, therefore, is combing the latter with the piecewise, linear 
nature of the resulting global costs function, making it possible to derive global optima. 
Nevertheless, an analysis of investment incentives in electricity transmission relies on numerical 
analysis to capture the physical nature of the network, so that conclusions remain feasible within a 
range of systems and cases. One challenging subject for future research topic is the examination of 
the external influences (e.g., geographical conditions) which might cause dysfunctional behaviors 
with sudden slope changes.  
The ultimate research challenge, however, is to identify the changes in network topology and the 
alternatives that minimize costs throughout the system. Recognizing that the number of 
configurations increases significantly with the number of nodes, nonetheless an exhaustive analysis 
of the properties of transmission cost functions should suggest future research to pursue. 
Once these challenges have been resolved, the emphasis should be on empirical assessments of line 
costs in order to combine our analytical approach with actual (engineering) data so that actual cost 
functions can be estimated in ways pioneered for telecommunications networks (Gasmi et al., 
2002).  
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Appendix
Figure 10: Global cost function, three-node network, fixed reactances 
Quadratic extension costsLinear extension costs
Source: Own calculation 
Figure 11: Global cost function, six-node network, fixed reactances 
Quadratic extension costsLinear extension costs
Source: Own calculation 
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Figure 10: Global cost function, three-node network, variable reactances 
Quadratic extension costsLinear extension costs
Source: Own calculation 
Figure 11: Global cost function, six-node network, fixed reactances 
Quadratic extension costsLinear extension costs
Source: Own calculation 
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